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of equity and by pleading that his property rights were about to be
interfered with he would be able to thwart criminal justice.13 This
reason should not be allowed to permit unwarranted police inter-
ference with one's business.
It is submitted that the best way for a court of equity to approach
this problem, granting that jurisdiction exists, is to look at the cir-
cumstances of the. individual case. It may consider the plaintiff's
conduct 'bad and refuse to take jurisdiction on the "clean hands"
maxim. It must, in any event, decide whether the officers are per-
forming official duties in a lawful manner and also whether the evi-
dence as to the illegality of the plaintiff's business is sufficient to
justify police interference. Equity must be controlled, however, by
broad principles of policy and must exercise considerable caution
whenever its decree will interfere with the enforcement of the crim-
inal law.
R L. R.
REAL PROPERTY
DEEDS - FEE SIMPLE DETERMINABLE - NECESSITY FOR
WORDS OF INHERITANCE IN REVERTER CLAUSE.
Defendants in an action to quiet title claimed a reversionary
interest as heirs of a grantor under an 1849 deed. The deed pro-
vided: ". . . The above tract is granted to ... trustees of aforesaid
New -Church Society . . . and their heirs forever, to be held by them
in trust forever . . . Now the conditions of this grant . . . is that
the above named meeting house is to be used for New Church pur-
poses. Provided that should it ever cease to be used for said purposes
that then the land is to return to its original owners."
The court rejected the defendant's claim of a reversionary in-
terest and held that the grant created a fee simple absolute. It said
that the reverter clause was not of sufficient force to make the
grantee's estate a determinable fee in the absence of words of in-
heritance used with the reversionary interest. First New Jerusalem
Church v. Singer, 68 Ohio App., 119 (I942).
The primary rule in construing conveyances is to effectuate the
intention of the grantor,2 and no special words are essential to create
13 Snyder v. Swope, Director of Safety, 23 Ohio L. R. 361, 366 (1922).
" For authority contra, see cases discussed in article, Reversionary Restrictions, (1940)
U. CIN. L. REv. 524, 526-532, which are contra by implication.
2 13 0. JuR. 891; see Post v. Weil, 115 N. Y. 361 (1889).
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a fee simple which will be determinable rather than absolute.3 In
construing intention, the court should look to the whole instrument
rather than any particular clause.4 Here the grantor's intention was
obviously to create a fee simple determinable, retaining a reversionary
interest by means of which possession could be taken when the
premises were no longer used for the purpose stipulated.
The court said the reverter clause might possibly be construed
as a covenant but not as a condition. The presence of an express
forfeiture clause would seem to negative any intention to create a
covenant alone,' and would seem to present at least as strong a case
for a determinable fee as Sperry v. Pond,G where such a fee was
found in a grant in fee simple "so long as used for church purposes
. . . and no longer." The court in the principal case distinguished
the Sperry case on the grounds that "there the limitation occurred
immediately as a qualification of the granting clause, whereas here
there was an unconditional grant of fee simple absolute which is
by the reverter clause sought to be modified." However, such a dis-
tinction seems arbitrary. Mere punctuation should not change the
iesult where the intention is clear. In the leading Ohio case of In
re Copps Chapel,7 a refusal to recognize a determinable fee was
supported by the debatable principle that an estate created in the
granting clause cannot be cut down by the habedunum clause.8 How-
ever, that theory is not applicable in the principal case; here the
reverter clause was an integral part of the granting clause.
As sole authority for the requirement of words of inherit-
ance in the reverter clause, the court quoted the syllabus of Embleton
v. McMechen,"' which held words of inheritance necessary to create
8 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3rd Ed.) 385, footnotes 46, 48. In the principal case,
the language seems appropriate to the creation of a fee simple determinable with pos-
sibility of reverter, but the analysis of the case would be similar for finding a fee simple on
condition subsequent with right of re-entry. For distinction between the two types of
fees see I TIFFANY,, REAL Pr oPERTY (3rd Ed.) p. 380.
4See note, (1938) 22 MINN. L. REv. 557, 558 and cases there cited. 4 TIFFANY,
RrAL PROPErTY (3rd Ed.), p. 66.
A stipulation in a convc -ance or devise will be construed, if possible, not to create
a condition. I TIFFANY, RE. PrOFErTY (3rd Ed.) p. 309; 13 0. JuR. 956, 957; foot-
notes 6 and 7, srpra. But here the language seems to show- a clear intention to create a
condition.
'Sperry v. Pond, 5 Ohio 388 (1832).
7 1In Re Copps Chapel, 120 Ohio St. 309, 166 N. E. 218 (1929), noted (1929) 9
BOSTON L. REv. 291; (1929) 3 U. CIN. L. REv. 491; (1930) 15 IA. L. REv. 206; (1939) 14
MINN.. L. REV. 187; (1929) 39 YALE L. J. 135.
54 TIFrAnY, REAL PrOFEFTy (3rd Ed.), p. 61. But in any case intention should be
construed in light of the whole instrument. See footnote 4, supra.
u Embleton v. Mcfechen, 110 Ohio St. 18, 143 N. E. 177, 34 A. L. R. 689 (1924).
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a fee simple in an executory estate in a 19o4 deed. This was the
common law rule as to grants, including grants of executory estates.
The rule has since been changed by G. C. 851o-I (1925) making
words of inheritance unnecessary in grants by deed. Inasmuch as
the deed in the principal case was made in 1849, the common law
rule would have been applicable as to executory estates; but the
principal case involved not an executory estate but a reversionary
interest. The common law never required words of inheritance in
the creation of reversionary interests 10 since reversions are not
granted but remain in the grantor.
The conclusion that a determinable fee was created finds addi-
tional support in this case in the doctrine that a trustee receives
only such title as is necessary for the purposes of his trust."
Although here the grant to the trustees was in terms an absolute fee,
it was in the form of a trust.'" In trusts the quantum of estate to
be taken by the beneficiary should be determined solely by the
grantor's expressed intention.'" Therefore the reverter clause in this
deed should have taken effect to limit the beneficiary's interest to a
determinable fee, and since the trustees would then need only a
determinable fee, a legal fee simple determinable should result.
H. S.M.
DOWER IN OHIO IN CASE OF FORCED SALE
A cotenant petitions for the partition of certain realty, claiming
an undivided one-half interest, and also for reasonable allowance
for permanent improvements made by the petitioner's assignor with
the other cotenant's consent. The latter's spouse claims right of
dower in his interest now held by a bankruptcy trustee and cross-
petitions for determination of the value of her estate therein and its
allowance to her out of the proceeds of the sale. Held: That the sale
be made, that the petitioner be allowed one-half of the value of the
improvements made, and that cross-petitioner's inchoate dower be
valued and paid out of the proceeds. Russell v. Russell, 137 Ohio
St. 153. In making the award of inchoate dower, the Court of
'- See footnote 3, .ropra.
" Young v. Bradley, 101 U. S. 782 (1879); 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS, pp. 482-487.
U That this probably was a passive trust would not alter the result, since there is no
Statute of Uses in Ohio.
13 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS, pp. 664-665.
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